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THE QUESTIONS THE RECORD SHOULD BE ABLE TO ANSWER

Do not fill an evidence gap with a conclusion.

The rebuilt docket carries forward the detailed questions that were easy to lose in the redesign: problem definition, impact studies, enforcement, product terms, 30% calibration, jobs, consumer outcomes, costs and competitive effects.

01

AUDITED CROSS-EXAMINATION

Questions designed to produce a verifiable record.

These questions pre-specify calibration, outcome, counterfactual and falsification issues before post-2027 results are known.

01 · Calibration & purpose

Why 30%?

FCNB publicly identifies compensation above 30% as a significant inducement. What empirical, behavioural, legal-comparative or supervisory analysis calibrated 30% as the breakpoint rather than 20%, 25%, 35% or 40%?

This asks for the calibration behind a published policy rationale; it does not assert that no rationale exists.
02 · Calibration & purpose

What is the pre-specified consumer outcome?

Is success expected to mean lower prices, fewer complaints, lower denial rates, improved rescission or refund compliance, better understanding, more alternative shopping, or some combination - and by how much?

An intervention is easier to evaluate when its success criteria are defined before the post-period is observed.
03 · Calibration & purpose

What would count as evidence that the intervention did not work?

What measurable post-implementation result would weaken the case that the intervention achieved its intended objective?

A useful evaluation needs a falsification condition, not only a list of possible successes.
04 · Calibration & purpose

Where should the displaced dollar go?

If dealer remuneration falls, is the intended mechanism a lower customer price, a lower financed balance, insurer or administrator retention, another distribution channel, or reduced product uptake - and how will that be measured?

Dealer loss, consumer saving and insurer retention are different economic outcomes.
05 · New Brunswick evidence

What does New Brunswick actually show?

Why are RIR-specific product price, penetration, remuneration, complaints, cancellations, claims or denials, and dealer-economic outcomes not visible in the public annual reporting reviewed?

The public record can establish the regime and regulator activity without establishing the dealer or consumer treatment effect.
06 · New Brunswick evidence

How should the public interpret 361 / 410 / 409?

Those figures are RIR firm licences produced, not dealership counts or active insurance transaction volumes. What is the active auto, RV and marine subset, and how did it change?

A licence-production series needs a business-type denominator before it can describe a dealer channel.
07 · B.C. implementation

What is the implementation denominator?

How many B.C. businesses, branches and individual sellers are expected in each class, and how will actual uptake, suspensions, cancellations and non-renewals be published?

Without the denominator, licence activity cannot be translated into market coverage.
08 · B.C. implementation

What is the final compliance-cost budget?

What are the final licence, E&O, designated-representative, training, systems and staff-time assumptions by business size once the Council program is final?

Direct compliance expense should be measured separately from behavioural effects on product sales or compensation.
09 · B.C. implementation

Why not freeze the B.C. baseline before transition?

Can 2024-2025 and 2026 consumer and dealer metrics be defined and published before post-treatment outcomes are known?

Because consultation and implementation guidance are already public, 2026 should be treated as a possible anticipation period rather than a pristine untreated year.
10 · B.C. implementation

How will transition be evaluated?

Existing motor dealers can remain under transitional treatment after January 1, 2027. Will evaluation use actual application, licensing and training dates rather than a single provincial switch?

Actual exposure dates matter to an event study when transition is staggered.
11 · Comparability & auditability

How will cross-channel comparability be handled?

Québec dealer and consumer-credit VSPED channels differ in context. Which product, borrower and insurer variables are required before treating their refusal-rate gap as evidence about distribution-channel effects?

A published descriptive comparison is not automatically a matched causal comparison.
12 · Comparability & auditability

How will source quality be labelled?

Will future public reporting identify whether figures are self-reported, audited, reconciled or regulator-validated?

AMF explicitly says the insurer-supplied data in its 2020-2022 analysis were not independently verified.
13 · Comparability & auditability

What explains the 30% lineage?

B.C. says proposed disclosures align with other restricted regimes. Which jurisdictions, provisions and analyses were used in drafting, and is there a documented model-rule or harmonization chain?

Chronology can show an older antecedent without proving direct copying.
14 · Symmetric falsification

What evidence would change the dealer side’s view?

If a credible controlled study found measurable consumer benefits with no material dealer or labour harm, what material-harm claim would be weakened?

The study should be able to disconfirm a large dealer-harm hypothesis.
15 · Symmetric falsification

What evidence would change the regulator side’s view?

If compliance costs or dealer and labour effects were material while measurable consumer outcomes did not improve, what review or adjustment criteria would apply?

The study should be able to disconfirm a large consumer-benefit hypothesis as well.
16 · Consumer-harm denominator

How many dealership cases actually defined the problem?

How many complaints, investigations, substantiated findings, restitution orders or enforcement matters involving dealer-distributed insurance were used to define the policy problem, broken out by product, year and transaction volume?

Aggregate insurance complaint activity cannot establish the incidence of a dealership-specific problem without a dealership and transaction denominator.
17 · Consumer-harm denominator

How many of those cases involved compensation above 30%?

Of the identified dealership matters, how many involved qualifying compensation above 30% of the client price, and how many involved a different issue such as disclosure wording, claims handling, cancellation, refund or product suitability?

This is required to connect the selected threshold to the problem population rather than to insurance complaints generally.
18 · Credit & affordability

What happens to financing approvals and lender capacity?

What is the expected effect on financed principal, lender advance ratios, payment bands, approval tiers, exceptions, lender reserve and product-financing allowances if affected products are repriced, removed or moved to another channel?

The direction is not predetermined: lower principal may improve some affordability metrics while lender-specific programme thresholds can create different effects.
19 · Tax & fiscal incidence

Which tax base is actually expected to move?

For each affected product class, what change is expected in PST, insurance-premium tax, federal luxury tax, GST/HST, taxable dealer income and payroll, and what taxable base supports each estimate?

A reduction in dealer compensation is not automatically a reduction in every tax head. Product classification and the actual taxable base control.
20 · Programme funding & enforcement

What will the RIA programme collect and what will it cost to run?

What are the expected application, annual, training and late-fee receipts by business tier, and what portion of programme spending is allocated to licensing, supervision, investigation, enforcement, technology, practice support and broader Council infrastructure?

Published fee rationale says the programme is intended to fund licensing, administration, oversight and practice support; a programme-specific budget and expected collections are needed to test cost recovery.
21 · Programme funding & enforcement

Who is actually deployed when something goes wrong?

Which body receives a complaint, investigates it, obtains transaction records, disciplines the agency or representative, coordinates with the VSA or BCFSA, and pursues unauthorized insurance activity? What staffing and escalation model has been budgeted?

The legal and operational stack should be visible to the public so existing and new oversight roles can be distinguished rather than assumed to be duplicative.
02

QUESTIONS RECOVERED FROM THE ORIGINAL CASE FILE

Keep the practical questions that operators kept asking.

These questions survived the source audit and are carried forward here rather than being stranded in a data module.

CASE FILE 01

Where is the published B.C. needs analysis?

The official materials cited on this page describe the framework and consultation, but do not supply a quantified B.C.-specific harm assessment. Publish any needs analysis, impact model and alternatives assessment used in the design.

CASE FILE 02

What will this cost, per seller, per rooftop?

Consultation materials propose a maximum $1,000 application fee, a tiered annual fee model and a maximum $500 late fee, while the Council Q&A says final amounts are still being determined. No final approved per-rooftop total, DR-course fee, seller-training price or E&O quote is established here.

CASE FILE 03

When will accredited courses be available, and on what terms?

The Council's accreditation page says sales representatives must complete accredited product training and anticipated applications for provider accreditation in fall 2026. This briefing has not verified a current list of accredited RIA courses, course duration, learner price or seat capacity.

CASE FILE 04

If I can't qualify in time, who takes my role?

Partly answered by the Council: every RIA business must appoint a Designated Representative, an officer, director, partner or sole proprietor, who takes a mandatory DR course and owns compliance. A short-term provision lets reps sell while accredited training catches up; its final conditions aren't published.

CASE FILE 05

What will lenders and underwriters be charged?

No published upstream cost figure is cited here. Publish the expected fee, training, oversight and insurance costs, and identify which parties are legally responsible for them.

CASE FILE 06

What else gets categorized as insurance or warranty?

Appearance, glass, theft, tire, key and similar products remain classification-sensitive with no definitive list.

CASE FILE 07

How will compensation disclosure apply across distribution structures?

Proposed Rule 7(25) applies to restricted insurance agencies. Reviewed sources do not establish a blanket OEM exemption. Publish examples covering factory-branded, third-party, captive-finance and referral structures so equivalent transactions can be compared.

CASE FILE 08

Will any product terms or renewal periods change?

No reviewed B.C. source requires one-year creditor-life, disability or critical-illness terms. If any regulator or insurer proposes a term change, publish the exact before-and-after wording and consumer continuity analysis.

CASE FILE 09

How will referral models change?

The founder reports off-site binding and referral compensation for some products. Publish the legal classification, compensation disclosure, product access and consumer-service effects for each proposed structure before extrapolating that observation across the menu.

CASE FILE 10

How are similar warranties classified across seller classes?

The legal result depends on the insurance class, seller category and product wording. Publish worked examples for automotive, electronics, appliance and other warranty channels so differences can be understood from the governing text.

CASE FILE 11

What does mandatory E&O cost once insurers reprice it?

Confirmed by the Council: businesses require E&O insurance for their insurance activities. The dealer principal-level DR is accountable for an F&I office they may not run day-to-day. What E&O costs once providers price that new exposure is the open number.

CASE FILE 12

Who enforces this, and with what capacity?

The prescribed unlicensed-agent contravention carries administrative maxima of $50,000 for a corporation and $25,000 for an individual. Publish the responsible bodies, staffing, service levels, investigation process and penalty guidance for the new regime.

CASE FILE 13

What is the cross-sector fiscal and workforce impact?

The NCDA/MNP study estimates $775M in annual government revenue from B.C. new-car retail using 2022 data. This briefing cites no comparable cross-sector model for the RIA regime. Ask the Ministry to publish its fiscal, sector-tax and workforce assumptions, if prepared.

03

THE AUDITED CASE FILE · 23 QUESTIONS · 10 SUBJECTS

The 23 questions the overview counts, subject by subject.

Open a subject to see what the reviewed public record shows, what is still missing, who owes the answer and the document to ask for. This is a different list from the recovered questions in section 02.

01Catalyst and proportionalityShow the measured problem, the alternatives, and why this remedy fits both.4 questions
PARTLY ANSWERED

What incident pattern, complaint count, and quantified consumer loss triggered this exact policy?

What the public record proves
The record contains real incidents, qualitative consumer concerns, and insurer-distribution weaknesses. The 2015 Council submission also said it had not experienced complaints arising from the relevant exemptions at that time.
What remains missing
A published B.C. baseline by product, channel, dealer type, harm type, remedy, and year that connects the measured problem to the chosen scope.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance, Insurance Council of B.C., BCFSA, and VSA
Document demanded
Publish the complaint, incident, investigation, enforcement, refund, and quantified-loss dataset used for the decision.
OPEN QUESTION

Which lighter alternatives were scored, and why was an eighteen-class Council overlay selected?

What the public record proves
The 2015 process discussed stronger insurer responsibility, individual licensing, greater Council powers, and an agency-level restricted model. The final framework resembles models used elsewhere.
What remains missing
A published alternatives scorecard comparing expected benefit, burden, duplication, enforceability, and small-business impact.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance
Document demanded
Release the decision note, signed Regulatory Impact Checklist or exemption form, options analysis, and issue-disposition matrix.
PARTLY ANSWERED

Why this remedy, why now, and what evidence connected the stated concern to an eighteen-class licensing system?

What the public record proves
The public chronology runs from the broad 2015 statutory review, through enabling legislation in 2019 and implementation consultation in 2022, to the operative regulations approved in December 2025.
What remains missing
The published causal chain from measured harm, through rejected alternatives, to the scope, timing, and design of this remedy.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish the decision memorandum, evidence inventory, alternatives analysis, issue-disposition record, and accountable decision owners.
PARTLY ANSWERED

Why propose contingent full-amount disclosure instead of Alberta-style disclosure of the fact of compensation?

What the public record proves
Alberta section 15(4) requires a restricted certificate holder who receives compensation from an insurer to disclose the fact of compensation; it states no amount, percentage, or threshold. Proposed B.C. Rule 7(25)(g) instead requires the full qualifying compensation amount in writing when it is more than 30% of the client product price. The B.C. rule remains proposed and has no effective date.
What remains missing
A published comparison of consumer benefit, behavioural response, competitive effect, compliance cost, and enforcement value under the two disclosure designs.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Release the jurisdictional comparison and decision analysis that selected the proposed B.C. design.
02Eighteen sectors, eighteen unanswered business casesA common licence does not create a common economic effect.2 questions
OPEN QUESTION

How many businesses, locations, representatives, and annual transactions are expected in each prescribed class?

What the public record proves
B.C. Reg. 245/2025 names eighteen business classes and pairs them with prescribed insurance classes.
What remains missing
A complete class-by-class B.C. population, transaction-volume, product-volume, revenue, and small-business baseline.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish the denominator used for staffing, fee design, training capacity, supervision, and impact analysis.

Sources in the public record

OPEN QUESTION

What regulatory gap remains after existing sector, insurer, lender, consumer, and court oversight?

What the public record proves
Vehicle dealers, insurers, financial institutions, travel sellers, funeral providers, and other classes already operate under different conduct and supervisory systems.
What remains missing
A published responsibility map showing the unresolved gap, referral path, duplicated powers, and net new protection for each class.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and all affected regulators
Document demanded
Release inter-regulator agreements, overlap analysis, referral protocols, and whether strengthened coordination was considered and how that option was assessed.
03Workers, payroll, and dealership familiesIf income is put at risk, the distributional analysis must reach the people behind it.2 questions
OPEN QUESTION

How many jobs, payroll dollars, and dependent families were included in the impact analysis?

What the public record proves
Dealer associations publish substantial employment and payroll footprints. The regulatory checklist explicitly asks about new staff and disproportionate small-business effects.
What remains missing
A public model connecting compliance cost or product-income scenarios to occupations, regions, wages, hours, and household exposure.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Jobs and Economic Growth
Document demanded
Publish the employment and distributional analysis with sensitivity ranges, not a single headline estimate.
OPEN QUESTION

Was consolidation or transfer of work to larger agencies, road representatives, or compliance providers modelled?

What the public record proves
The regime places formal accountability on the licensed business and its designated representative while permitting employee and nonemployee representatives.
What remains missing
A published analysis of whether fixed compliance costs favour large groups, change local ownership, or shift jobs between businesses.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Release the small-versus-large firm analysis and any mitigation for rural, independent, and single-location businesses.
04Lenders, reserve, and borrowingOptional financed products also sit inside lender economics.2 questions
OPEN QUESTION

What financed principal, reserve, and lifetime interest could move under each take-up scenario?

What the public record proves
Optional products can be financed, so a change in product price or take-up can change principal. The direction is mechanical; the magnitude requires actual lender and dealer inputs.
What remains missing
A published lender-specific model using product volume, advance rate, reserve contracts, APR, term, refunds, prepayment, and credit performance.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance, lenders, and dealer finance partners
Document demanded
Publish or commission sensitivity tables and disclose the assumptions used for lender exposure.
OPEN QUESTION

Could lower financed product revenue alter approval, rate, term, reserve, or dealer participation decisions?

What the public record proves
The public proposal regulates insurance distribution and disclosure. It does not require any particular lender response.
What remains missing
Evidence from lenders on credit policy, dealer compensation, customer payment, loss performance, and whether any benefit is passed through.
Who owns the answer
Lenders, Ministry of Finance, and federal financial consumer authorities
Document demanded
Obtain lender submissions and publish a response matrix separating mechanical principal effects from behavioural decisions.
05Treasury and public-value ledgerConsumer savings and public revenue both require measured behaviour, not slogans.3 questions
OPEN QUESTION

Where is the provincial and federal fiscal-impact analysis?

What the public record proves
Dealer activity contributes payroll, corporate income, consumption, and other taxes. Federal luxury-tax guidance excludes many optional F&I products from vehicle consideration, so a blanket tax claim would be wrong.
What remains missing
A transaction- and tax-specific study of taxable-income, payroll, consumption, price, volume, and product-mix scenarios.
Who owns the answer
B.C. Treasury Board, Ministry of Finance, and Department of Finance Canada
Document demanded
Publish the fiscal model, tax-base definitions, behavioural assumptions, rates, offsets, and sensitivity ranges.
OPEN QUESTION

How will government measure whether consumers are actually better off?

What the public record proves
Written transparency and consistent oversight may help consumers. Lower prices are possible, but are not required. If availability or take-up falls for creditor life, disability, Critical Health, job-loss, warranty, tire, towing, or repair protection, a household may be left carrying a risk it cannot absorb.
What remains missing
A published success framework covering price, access, take-up, cancellation, claims, coverage continuity, household outcomes, complaints, shopping time, and pass-through of compliance cost.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance, Insurance Council of B.C., BCFSA, and Consumer Protection B.C.
Document demanded
Set a pre-launch baseline, public reporting cadence, independent evaluation date, and correction trigger.
OPEN QUESTION

Where is the integrated whole-economy impact study for the complete regime?

What the public record proves
The reviewed public record contains regulatory instruments, consultations, qualitative rationale, a regulatory checklist, and proposed fee material. Each answers part of the file.
What remains missing
One integrated analysis covering dealers, workers and families, lenders, insurers and providers, consumers, provincial and federal tax bases, compliance markets, regional access, and competitive structure.
Who owns the answer
B.C. Treasury Board, Ministry of Finance, Insurance Council of B.C., and Department of Finance Canada
Document demanded
Publish the integrated study, or state that it was not located in the named public record reviewed as of September 4, 2026 and identify what internal or unindexed analysis exists.
06Fees and the full compliance billA fee schedule is not a total-cost estimate.2 questions
PARTLY ANSWERED

What will each business actually pay, and when will the final amounts be known?

What the public record proves
Council materials distinguish proposed RIA application, annual and late-fee ceilings from general course-accreditation rule changes. Actual charges and the complete business-level compliance cost must be checked separately.
What remains missing
Final invoiced amounts, representative-band counts, timing, proration, refunds, and a total expected fee take across all classes.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C. and Minister of Finance
Document demanded
Publish the approved schedule, fee-setting model, expected licensee population, annual revenue, and use of proceeds.
OPEN QUESTION

Who pays for training, E&O, designated-representative time, file review, systems, legal advice, and lost selling time?

What the public record proves
The proposed framework creates duties and qualification inputs beyond the published Council fee caps.
What remains missing
A class- and size-specific total-cost-of-compliance estimate, including recurring internal labour and third-party spend.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish first-year and recurring cost models for a small business, multi-location group, and high-volume retailer.
07Rollout, capacity, and service standardsAn enacted date without an executable path is an operational risk.2 questions
PARTLY ANSWERED

What is the dated critical path for applications, courses, accreditation, E&O, systems, and approvals?

What the public record proves
January 1, 2027 is enacted. Council has published anticipated steps and acknowledged that temporary training accommodation may be needed.
What remains missing
A complete service-ready schedule with opening dates, dependencies, capacity, turnaround targets, failure handling, and owner for each milestone.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish the rollout plan, weekly readiness dashboard, application opening date, accredited-course inventory, and contingency criteria.
OPEN QUESTION

What service level will prevent unanswered questions from becoming business interruptions?

What the public record proves
The Council is the licensing and compliance contact under the new framework. No public RIA-specific service standard was located in the named record.
What remains missing
Forecast contact volume, staffing, escalation channels, response-time commitments, application turnaround, and urgent transaction support.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish service levels, staffing assumptions, queue metrics, escalation paths, and monthly performance after launch.
08Compliance market and private vendorsIf a new market is being created, disclose who designs, sells, accredits, and supervises it.2 questions
OPEN QUESTION

Is any private firm contracted or positioned to deliver the RIA compliance, technology, training, inspection, or rollout layer?

What the public record proves
Council policy permits procurement and identifies circumstances where public tendering may not occur. No official award naming an RIA delivery vendor was located in the reviewed public record.
What remains missing
The RIA project vendor register, solicitations, awards, statements of work, amendments, invoices, payments, and procurement exceptions.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C. and Ministry of Finance
Document demanded
Publish the complete vendor and contractor record, including beneficial ownership, affiliations, evaluation criteria, and conflict declarations.
OPEN QUESTION

Who may sell accredited training or compliance services, and how will conflicts and market concentration be controlled?

What the public record proves
Council materials contemplate accredited courses and a course-accreditation fee. Accreditation does not itself grant a vendor regulatory authority.
What remains missing
Applicants, affiliations, decisions, curriculum ownership, prices, capacity, conflicts, quality controls, and complaint mechanisms.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish the accreditation register, evaluation records, course prices, capacity, conflicts, and reasons for every approval or refusal.
09Awareness and notice penetrationPosting a notice is not the same as reaching the people who must act on it.2 questions
PARTLY ANSWERED

Who was notified, through which channel, on what date, and with what verified delivery or engagement?

What the public record proves
Government, Council, and some sector bodies published notices, consultation pages, and guidance. Those pages prove availability.
What remains missing
The recipient universe, send and delivery logs, open or attendance metrics, class breakdown, follow-up sequence, and readiness result.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance, Insurance Council of B.C., VSA, and sector associations
Document demanded
Release the notice plan and channel metrics, with coverage against the full regulated-business population.
OPEN QUESTION

Why does owner-reported field awareness remain near zero among the people expected to implement the regime?

What the public record proves
The founder reports asking about one hundred industry people, including at least twelve dealers, with no dealer able to explain RIA and only a few representatives recognizing the term. This is anecdotal, not a representative survey.
What remains missing
An independent, denominator-defined readiness survey across every prescribed class and job role.
Who owns the answer
Insurance Council of B.C., Ministry of Finance, and affected associations
Document demanded
Commission and publish a statistically defensible awareness and implementation-readiness survey before launch.
10OEM and independent competitive neutralityCompare legal structures and transaction economics, not badges.2 questions
PARTLY ANSWERED

How does the regime apply to manufacturer-as-obligor, captive, factory-branded, dealer-agent, third-party, and referral structures?

What the public record proves
The regulation applies to motor vehicle dealers without a blanket franchised or independent distinction. The linked exemption change narrows specified manufacturer, dealer, and affiliate treatment when acting as an insurance agent.
What remains missing
A published structure-by-structure decision tree with worked contracts, obligors, insurers, compensation flows, and licensing outcomes.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance, BCFSA, and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Publish binding or counsel-reviewed examples covering the main OEM, captive, independent, RV, and third-party structures.
OPEN QUESTION

Was competitive neutrality tested between OEM-franchised, independent used-vehicle, RV, marine, farm, and equipment dealers?

What the public record proves
Different dealer types have different access to factory-backed products, capital, systems, scale, and compliance resources. The proposed 30% test measures qualifying compensation against the client price, not the dealer badge.
What remains missing
A published competition analysis using actual rate cards, product structures, margins, scale, and compliance cost by dealer type.
Who owns the answer
Ministry of Finance and Insurance Council of B.C.
Document demanded
Release the competitive-neutrality analysis or commission one before the final conduct and fee rules are approved.

An integrated whole-economy impact analysis covering dealer F&I, employment, families, lenders, consumers, tax bases, product access, aggregate compliance cost, and competitive structure was not located in the named public record reviewed as of September 4, 2026. This does not prove no internal or unindexed analysis exists.

04

IMPLEMENTATION / ENFORCEMENT

Who does the work, what data do they use, and who pays?

Implementation mechanics are economic facts too. Systems, monitoring, procurement, staffing and data access belong in the public record.

  • Who will operationally monitor compliance: the Insurance Council, another public body, contracted auditors, DMS/menu vendors, insurers, or some combination?
  • Will transaction-level DMS or menu-system data be required? If so: which fields, how often, under what authority, with what retention and privacy controls?
  • If a private compliance technology or audit vendor will be used, what procurement, selection, cost, conflict and data-governance rules will apply?
  • Which specific incidents, complaints, enforcement matters or recurring fact patterns were used to define the problem this regime is intended to solve?
  • What existing tools were available to the VSA, BCFSA, Consumer Protection B.C., insurers and other oversight bodies, and what specific gap remained after those tools were considered?
  • What is the competitive-impact analysis for OEM-affiliated versus independent third-party products and providers? If similar consumer outcomes receive different treatment, what is the policy rationale?
  • What product-classification process will determine whether appearance, protection, warranty, service-contract and ancillary offerings are insurance in a specific structure?
  • What is the projected annual Council fee collection by business class and representative tier, and what operating costs are those collections intended to recover?
  • How many dealership-specific complaints, investigations, findings, restitution orders and enforcement matters were used to define the consumer problem, and what transaction denominator was used?
  • How many of those matters involved compensation above 30% of the client price rather than a different conduct, claims, cancellation, refund or suitability issue?
  • Which regulator owns intake, investigation, discipline, unauthorized-insurance enforcement and cross-referral for an RIA dealership complaint, and what staffing model supports each step?
  • What lender-programme evidence was considered regarding financed principal, approval bands, advance limits, payment thresholds and back-end product allowances?
  • What product-by-product tax-incidence analysis was performed for PST, insurance-premium tax, federal luxury tax, GST/HST, corporate income tax and payroll?
TURN QUESTIONS INTO A RECORD REQUEST

Select the questions that matter to your industry and send them through an official contact channel.

The letter builder remains editable. It does not send anything automatically and does not require a reader to adopt a political conclusion.

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